The Need for and the Role of Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Behavioral-Science-and-Law Scholarship by Carson, David & Tomkins, Alan
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Alan Tomkins Publications Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska 
October 1997 
The Need for and the Role of Comparative and Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives in Behavioral-Science-and-Law Scholarship 
David Carson 
University of Southampton 
Alan Tomkins 
University of Nebraska, atomkins@nebraska.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicytomkins 
 Part of the Public Policy Commons 
Carson, David and Tomkins, Alan, "The Need for and the Role of Comparative and Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives in Behavioral-Science-and-Law Scholarship" (1997). Alan Tomkins Publications. 11. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicytomkins/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Alan Tomkins Publications 
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Published in Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 15 (1997), pp. 321-328. Copyright © 1997 John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd. Used by permission.
SPECIAL PERSPECTIVE
Th e Need for and the Role of 
Comparative and 
Cross-Cultural Perspectives in 
Behavioral-Science-and-Law Scholarship
David Carson, L.L.B., 
and Alan J. Tomkins, J.D., Ph.D.
Behavioral-science-and-law scholarship suff ers from the lack of many 
activities examining issues from a com parative or cross-cultural per-
spective. Although U.S. contributions tend to be the most insular, the 
problem applies to virtually all behavioral-science-and-law endeavors. 
Th is special perspective examines the trend in behavioral-science-and-
law scholarship) presents data to support the allegation that there are 
few comparative/cross-cultural contributions) off ers explanations for 
the situation, and advocates for the introduction of more compara-
tive/cross-cultural eff orts in the future. 
THE PROBLEM
Th ere is a paucity of comparative scholarship on behavioral-science-and-law issues. Despite 
the proliferation of behavioral-science-and-law activities during the past two decades (see, 
e.g.. Bull & Carson, 1995; Hess & Weiner, in press; Kagehiro & Laufer, 1992; Monahan & 
Walker, 1994; Small & Weiner, 1993; see generally, Melton, Huss, & Tomkins, in press; Ogl-
off , Tomkins, & Bersoff , 1996); despite the international membership of such organizations 
as the American Psychology-Law Society, the American Association of Correctional Psy-
chology, the European Association of Psychology and Law (EAPL), the International Acad-
emy of Law and Mental Health, and the Law and Society Association; despite the fact that
David Carson is with the Faculty of Law, University of Southampton, and Alan J. Tomkins is with the Uni-
versity of Nebraska–Lincoln. Th e preparation of this article was supported in part by a faculty development 
leave from UNL provided to the second author.
321
322      Carson & Tomkins in Behavioral Sciences and the Law 15 (1997)
behavioral-science-and-law conferences attract participants from around the world (al-
though most participants come from North America, Western Europe) and Australia/New 
Zealand, participants also come from Eastern Europe, Asia, and South and Central Amer-
ica); and despite the proliferation of behavioral-science-and-law journals with international 
editorial boards, most behavioral-science-and-law research and writing ignores an interna-
tional or comparative perspective. Th e American behavioral-science-and-law community 
seems to be the most “guilty” of ignoring international and comparative perspectives (see 
Carson & Tomkins, 1996).
U.S. CULPABILITY
Both U.S.-based, behavioral-science-and-law journals and the work published in these 
journals refl ect the focus on “America”—American authors, American issues, and American 
references/citations. By way of example, we will focus on Behavioral Sciences & the Law; al-
though we restrict our fi nger-pointing to this journal, a similar claim could be made for 
Law and Human Behavior and probably for the other major, behavioral-science-and-law 
journals published in the U.S.
Consider the most recent issues of Behavioral Sciences & the Law (volumes 13 (1995) 
and 14 (1996), issues 1–4, and volume 15 (1997), issue 1). Th e nine BS&L issues cov-
ering Vol. 13(1) to Vol. 15(1) contained 61 articles. Nine special topics were examined. 
(BS&L is a special topics journal, though it also publishes Research Reports, Special Per-
spectives, and other kinds of articles as well.) Th e nine Special Topics were “Psycholegal As-
pects of Death,” “Behavioral Science Evidence in the Wake of Daubert” “Aging and the 
Law,” “Psychological Testing and the Law,” “Biomedical Innovation,” and “Professional Li-
ability.” Fifty-four of the 61 articles were Special Topics articles. In addition, there were fi ve 
Research Reports and two Special Perspectives. Th e 61 articles published in the journal re-
fl ect the array of activities and approaches (e.g., some empirical contributions, some con-
ceptual contributions, some reviews of legal and/or psychological literatures) that generally 
characterize behavioral-science-and-law research and writing.
Of the 61 articles, over 90% of the fi rst authors were affi  liated with American institu-
tions or agencies at the time of publication (57/61, though in one instance the fi rst au-
thor had initiated his work in Canada before joining an American university for graduate 
school). Th ree of the four other articles had Canadian-affi  liated fi rst authors (in one in-
stance, the fi rst author initiated the work in Canada but was affi  liated with a university in 
England at the time of publication); the remaining author was from Australia. Most of the 
articles focused exclusively on American behavioral-science-and-law perspectives, although 
many of the articles dealt with issues that are germane outside of the U.S. Th e only explic-
itly comparative project that was reported on during this period was from one of the fi rst-
author-from Canada articles (i.e., Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). An exam-
ination of the references reveals that the vast majority are from U.S.-based publications. 
(It is possible that some of the U.S. references were actually written by non-American au-
thors.) Th us, as expected, it appears that American-authored articles almost universally use 
only North American (i.e., U.S. and Canadian) perspectives and references.
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Th ere are several possible explanations for the insular approach to behavioral-science-
and-law scholarship refl ected in the BS&L articles. It could be argued that an American-
run journal is likely to attract contributions primarily from American (and Canadian) au-
thors. It could be argued that the topics selected were focused on American issues and that 
they did not warrant an international or comparative perspective. It also could be argued 
that non-American publications are fewer and of more recent vintage (e.g., European be-
havioral-science-and-law journals have trailed U.S. journals by at least a decade in terms 
of numbers of journals, and the general interest in behavioral-science-and-law outside the 
U.S. seems to be about a decade—or more—behind what has been happening in the U.S. 
and Canada), so there is less of an opportunity to use non-American sources. Such argu-
ments are lamentable in some instances, and inaccurate in others.
Th e fact that a journal is coordinated by Americans does not explain the lack of non-
American contributions. American medical journals regularly publish work from non-U.S. 
researchers. What are medical journals doing to attract non-American publications that be-
havioral-science-and-law journals are not? Although one might wonder whether non-Amer-
icans are submitting manuscripts but not getting them published, the experience of one of 
us (AJT) does not bear out that hypothesis. BS&L is not receiving many manuscripts from 
non-U.S./Canadian authors. Assuming it is true that BS&L and other American, behav-
ioral-science-and-law journals attract few non-American contributors, then it is a problem 
for the fi eld. As attested by the numbers and the quality of presentations at EAPL meet-
ings, there are many potential articles that could be published in American journals.
Th e foci of the Special Topics also do not adequately explain the dearth of authors and/
or perspectives from outside the U.S. and an American legal case (the “Evidence in the 
Wake of Daubert” issue), all of the topics—even the Daubert issue—have relevance and ap-
plications outside the U.S./Canada, Each of the issues could have benefi ted from an inter-
national or comparative perspective.
Th e fact that there are so few references to non-American scholarship is not likely at-
tributable to the availability (or lack thereof ) of sources outside the U.S. As we will dis-
cuss below, Europeans regularly cite to works from Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, 
along with works from the U.S. and Canada. If Europeans can fi nd these works, so could 
Americans.
Th e most likely explanation for the observed pattern is the insularity of Americans. Th is 
insularity permeates U.S. society. It is refl ected in most Americans knowing only English 
and no other language, most Americans knowing little about non-American arts and cul-
ture, and so on. Th ere is no reason to expect that Americans change their ways simply be-
cause they have become behavioral-science-and-law professionals.
Th e lack of international perspectives and/or comparative projects is disappointing. Th e 
lack is not attributable to ignorance of a comparative point of view. American law schools 
typically off er courses in international law and courses that examine American law in light 
of its English roots (e.g., property law). Th e European roots of American psychology rou-
tinely are explored in “History and Systems” courses. American social psychology has long 
had a tradition of thinking about issues from the viewpoint of the “Martian” who just 
landed in our midst. Yet, despite the exposures to non-American materials and despite the 
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traditions of looking outside the American context, most American behavioral-science-
and-law scholarship focuses on American topics, uses American social scientifi c sources, 
and discusses only American Law.
OUTSIDE THE U.S.
Is it diff erent elsewhere? For example, are European journals and European scholars as 
likely to be immersed in their own culture as are Americans? Would the author-affi  liation 
pattern display the same kind of geographical bias represented in BS&L?
To compare the BS&L situation, we looked at a European journal similar to BS&L. Th e 
journal. Expert Evidence, is the fi rst European journal specifi cally focusing on behavioral 
science and law issues. It is edited by two scholars from Britain, including one of the au-
thors of this article (DC). We examined the 62 articles published in Expert Evidence since 
its inception in 1992.
Th e publication pattern was diff erent for EE than for BS&L. Slightly over 60% of the 
fi rst authors were based in the U.K. (38/62), which means that almost 40% of the fi rst-au-
thors were from outside the U.K. Eight were from other parts of Europe, nine were from 
the U.S., and seven from elsewhere. Put another way, roughly 25% of Expert Evidence arti-
cles were from outside Europe.
Clearly, Expert Evidence readers are more likely to be learning about international per-
spectives than readers of Behavioral Sciences & the Law. Moreover, citations to non-U.K. 
sources are commonplace in Expert Evidence (as they are for all other European-based jour-
nals that address behavioral-science-and-law issues). Indeed, citations are not simply to 
works from the U.K. or the U.S. Large numbers of articles include references from addi-
tional, albeit primarily English-language, sources.
What about comparative projects? Overall, articles in the issues of Expert Evidence were 
far more concerned with matters outside of the U.K. than articles in Behavioral Sciences 
& the Law were concerned with matters outside of North America, For example, fi ve arti-
cles in a special issue of Expert Evidence (Volume 4, Issue 3) discussed an American judicial 
opinion (United States v. Shonubi, 1995). One article was a consensus statement reached by 
an international group of scholars (Lamb, 1994). Still, only fi ve of the articles in EE could 
be described as “comparative” in that the article explicitly considered the laws of two or 
more countries (e.g., McCormack, 1993) or examined a behavioral-science-and-law issue 
across jurisdictions (e.g., Gatowski, Dobbin, Richardson, Nowlin, & Ginsburg, 1996; cf. 
Gatowski, Dobbin, Richardson, & Ginsburg, this issue).
Th ese data—for whatever their worth—suggest that a European behavioral-science-and-
law journal may be more likely to publish work from scholars outside the editors jurisdic-
tion than an American journal. Th ere appears to be a greater likelihood of fi nding an extra-
jurisdictional citation/reference in a European journal than in an American journal. But 
our examination also revealed that truly comparative works are few in the behavioral-sci-
ence-and-law literature. Why are there so few comparative projects?
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A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE LACK OF 
COMPARATIVE SCHOLARSHIP
A major barrier to comparative projects is the diffi  culty in such undertakings. Th e reasons 
why a particular country has developed a particular law, let alone its procedures, are com-
plex, and simplistic applications of one jurisdiction^ practices or rules may not be at all 
fruitful. Cross-cultural studies can only be suggestive in many instances.
We believe that another important factor to explain the lack of comparative work is the 
pragmatic and practitioner orientation of behavioral-science-and-the-law studies. We think 
that behavioral-science-and-law research agenda has been substantially set by lawyers and 
the needs of courts.
A similar observation was made by Steadman and his MacArthur Mental Health Law 
Research Network colleagues (1993). Th ey noted how perceptions of the issues in risk as-
sessment have been shaped by courts’ interests rather than clinicians’ interests. And if the 
law is going to shape the research agenda, then we might anticipate that the resultant in-
quiry will be national, problem orientated, parochial even.
A related pragmatic concern is that comparative or international perspectives fi nd a 
chilly welcome by the targeted legal community. A recent inquiry in the United Kingdom 
serves as a case-in-point (Rundman, 1993). Public disquiet with the number of high pro-
fi le wrongful convictions led to the British government establishing a Royal Commission 
to examine the criminal justice system. Th ey were offi  cially encouraged to consider recom-
mending adoption of a more investigatory trial system, as dominant in the rest of Europe. 
However the Royal Commission’s consideration of the case for such a dramatic change was 
cursory. Th ey thought it too radical a step given the weight of tradition, and the Commis-
sion felt that some of the claims for the investigatory system were overstated. Nor was, for 
example, the research on decision-making and common causes of error considered. But 
then there is little active debate about the respective merits of diff erent trial systems (McE-
wan, 1992). Changing trial systems would be too radical, so it is most unlikely to occur 
and it is, therefore, not worth serious consideration.
In general, U.K. scholarship typically does not examine law and practice in Denmark, 
the Netherlands, or other European countries (unless the inquiry examines a specifi c law 
relating to the European Community). Th is is similar, of course, to the U.S.
It is interesting to note that to the extent there is an exception to the “lack of com-
parative scholarship^ criticism, the exception seems to emanate from “Commonwealth” 
countries. Canadian scholarship often compares Canadian rules and practices to the U.S. 
As a general matter, scholarship from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand often includes 
a comparison to Britain, to the U.S., and to other Commonwealth countries (see, e.g., 
Freckelton, this issue).
Th e Commonwealth situation suggests the possibility that under certain circumstances 
(perhaps circumstances of culture and of history), there is a greater likelihood (than in 
the absence of such circumstances) that behavioral-science-and-law scholars will undertake 
comparative eff orts. However, even Commonwealth scholars are not producing a large cor-
pus of comparative literature.
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THE NEED FOR AND THE ROLE OF 
COMPARATIVE SCHOLARSHIP
As we have already conceded, comparative studies are not simple. Indeed the main role for 
comparative studies may be in stretching the imagination. It can remind us that there are 
a range of diff erent ways in which particular issues can be conceived and tackled. How do 
other countries conceptualize the criminal responsibility of people with mental disorders? 
How do they ensure appropriate responses to their crimes? How have particular responses 
come to be perceived as “appropriate” by the diff erent powerful interests groups?
Despite the problems in comparing diff erent systems, diff erent cultures, and so on, 
comparative research has great potential. Indeed, American legal scholarship regularly com-
pares practices and laws across the States. International perspectives off er the possibilities of 
examining issues from a new, fresh perspective and it does so without the need to rely on 
Martians. Intel-nationalization off ers the possibility of allowing researchers and commen-
tators to consider alternative perspectives in dealing with problems. Indeed, a compara-
tive approach to conceptualizing behavioral-science-and-law problems  and their solutions 
prompts  an advantageous broadening of horizons by forcing the consideration of addi-
tional ways of “doing business” and solving problems.
It is our position that a considerable amount of behavioral-science-and-law research and 
writing would benefi t from a comparative perspective. Although we do not go so far as to 
argue that the bulk of it should be cross-cultural, the virtual absence of any of it is a signif-
icant omission. A comparative perspective might prompt one to wonder whether develop-
ments in American mental health/justice systems interactions have been driven by a legal 
agenda and whether behavioral scientists have been responding, perhaps too uncritically, to 
legal defi nitions of problems or to lawyers’ pragmatic needs for assistance in trials. Th e de-
fense of diminished responsibility, in England and Wales for example, involves expert evi-
dence being given on the defendants “mental responsibility^ for his or her acts. Clinicians 
will give evidence on this issue even though the questions would be more appropriately 
posed to philosophers, moralists, and clerics. Perhaps we should be more open in recog-
nizing the extent to which the agenda in law and behavioral sciences is being driven by re-
formist motives and concern to achieve what is perceived to be the best outcome for indi-
vidual clients. Th e adversarial legal system has a very strong infl uence over the agenda.
Expert evidence issues provide a case in point. Expert evidence is something of great im-
port to mental health professionals (see, e.g., Faust & Ziskin, 1988), and it is an issue ap-
parently of great concern to legal systems throughout the world (e.g., Bernstein, 1996; 
Freckelton & Selby, 1995; Nijboer, 1992; Odgers & Richardson, 1995). Understanding 
expert evidence would be facilitated by analyses of the ways that diff erent jurisdictions with 
their contrasting legal systems—for example, the use of investigatory rather than adversar-
ial, judges as fact-fi nders—treat novel scientifi c information. Expert evidence issues may be 
infl uenced by the diff erent legal tests that are used across legal systems—for example, dif-
ferences in tests of a litigant’s “capacity” across jurisdictions—and analyses of the nexus be-
tween legal tests, of opportunities for litigant participation in legal proceedings, and of 
how communities’ norms of justice infl uence legal rules and practices could help develop a 
more sophisticated understanding of expert evidenced role in the complex legal systems in 
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which such evidence is used. At a minimum, diff erences provide valuable opportunities for 
comparative research. In each jurisdiction there is concern about the eff ects of lawyers’ ex-
amination techniques on the presentation and understanding of expert evidence. Th ere is 
also concern about the quality of the scientifi c evidence being off ered and those speaking 
to it. Th ese are not just local problems. Law may be national) but science is international.
We think that many of these issues could—and should—be addressed at a more inter-
national level. Behavioral-science-and-law scholarship can—and should—be targeted to is-
sues of international law) international institutions) and to the international network of 
law commissions and similar bodies. Politicians and commentators are telling us that we 
live in a global economy; behavioral-science-and-law scholars operate in a global environ-
ment as well. Contributions can span numerous possibilities. Where are developing coun-
tries to get their expert evidence from? How will, and how should) the internet be used as 
a means of providing expert evidence? Th e Netherlands allows defendants to have second 
DNA samples tested in the laboratories of another country—what other kinds of expert 
information could equally profi t from crossing borders?
We realize that there will be many problems in conducting comparative research. For 
example) diff erences in cross-examination styles between the U.K. and U.S. (though both 
involve adversarial systems) may result in a researcher’s detection of diff erences that might 
be attributed to jurisprudential diff erences between the two systems. It is imperative to en-
sure the proper development of research protocols and interpretation of research data.
In conclusion) it is probably not overstating the case to accuse U.S. scholars of being the 
most myopic when it comes to adopting an international perspective. But then European 
scholars have had the advantage that they have simply had to look to North America if 
they wished to develop their interests. Americans) of course, cover so much geography and 
have such international importance when it comes to science and to law. Nevertheless) we 
believe that the trend toward globalization found in industry) politics) culture) and so on 
should be refl ected in some behavioral-science-and-law inquiries) too. Th ere is the potential 
for making important contributions if we increase the internationalization of perspectives 
in relevant research and writing. A more comparative approach also surely will help to re-
dress the balance and allow behavioral scientists to shape the scholarship agenda more per-
suasively. We encourage members of the behavioral-science-and-law communities to keep 
international perspectives in mind.
REFERENCES
Bernstein, D. E. (1996). Junk science in the United States and the Commonwealth. Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Law 21, 123-182.
Bull, R., & Carson, D. (Eds.). (1995). Handbook of psychology in legal contexts. New York: Wiley. 
Carson, D., &, Tomkins, A. (1996, Fall). Th e relationship between law and the behavioral sciences: Interna-
tional perspectives. American Psychology-Law Society News, 16, 15. 
Faust, D., & Ziskin, J. (1988). Th e expert witness in psychology and psychiatry. Science 241, 31–35. 
Freckelton, I., & Selby, H. (1995). Expert evidence (4 vols. & suppl.) Sydney, Australia: Law Book Co. 
Hess, A. K., & Weiner, I. B. (Eds,), (in press). Handbook of forensic psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
328      Carson & Tomkins in Behavioral Sciences and the Law 15 (1997)
Kagehiro, D. K., & Laufer, W. S. (1992). Handbook of psychology and law, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Lamb, M. E. (1993–94). Th e investigation of child sexual abuse: An interdisciplinary consensus statement. 
Expert Evidence 2, 151–156.
McCormack, H. (1993-94). Th e admissibility of expert evidence in the dynamics of child sex abuse in crimi-
nal cases in Canada and the United States. Expert Evidence 2, 3–10.
McEwan, J. (1992). Evidence and the adversarial process: Th e modem law. Oxford: Blackwell.
Melton, O., B., Huss, M. T., & Tomkins, A. J. (in press). Training in forensic psychology and the law. In A. 
K. Hess & I. B. Weiner (Eds.), Handbook of forensic psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Monahan J., & Walker, L. (1994). Social science in law: Cases and materials (3rd ed.). Mineola, NY: Founda-
tion Press.
Nijboer, H. (1992). Forensic expertise in Dutch criminal procedure. Cardozo Law Review 14, 165–191.
Odgers, S.,  & Richardson, J. (1995). Keeping bad science out of the courtroom—Changes in American and 
Australian expert evidence law. University of New South Wales Law Journal 18, 108–129.
Ogloff , J. J. P., Tomkins, A. J., & Bersoff , D. N. (1996). Education and training in psychology and law/crim-
inal justice: Historical foundations, present structures, and future developments. Criminal Justice and Be-
havior 23, 200–235.
Peterson, M., Stephens, J., Dickey, R., & Lewis, W. (1996). Transsexuals within the prison system: An inter-
national survey of correctional policies. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 14, 219–229.
Runciman, V. (1993). Th e Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. London: HMSO.
Small & Weiner, 1993.
Steadman, H. J., Monahan, J., Clark Robbins, P., Appelbaum, P., Grisso, T., Klassen, D., Mulvey, E. P., & 
Roth, L. (1993). From dangerousness to risk assessment: Implications for appropriate risk strategies. In 
S. Hodgins (Ed.), Mental disorder and crime (pp. 39–62). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
